Do you care more about your experiences in the present or
the memories you will have in the future?
In Thinking, Fast and
Slow, Daniel Kahneman, winner of the 2002 Nobel Prize in Economics,
explores this question. He clearly distinguishes between the “remembering self”
and the “experiencing self.” The former is characterized by all the memories
one has accumulated over a lifetime, while the latter deals solely with the
present moment. One may expect (or at least hope) that these two selves remain
consistent with one another, but Kahneman shows that there are many instances
in which they are in conflict.
One famous study by Kahneman, Fredrickson, Schreiber, and Redelmeier had participants put one of their hands in painfully cold water (14°C) while placing their other hand on a keyboard to rate the amount of pain they were experiencing. In the short trial, participants put their hand in the cold water for 60 seconds. In the long trial, participants put their hand in the cold water for 90 seconds. The first 60 seconds of the long trial was the same as the short trial, but the last 30 seconds differed in that the temperature rose by 1°C. Objectively, the 2nd trial was more painful because it included the same initial 60 seconds of pain with an additional 30 seconds.
The subjects were then asked which trial they wanted to
repeat. While the shorter trial was less painful, “80% of the participants who
reported that their pain diminished during the final phase of the longer
episode opted to repeat it, thereby declaring themselves willing to suffer 30
seconds of needless pain in the anticipated third trial,” (Kahneman 383).
Kahneman explained this result using two hypotheses that he
had been trying to prove:
- The peak-end hypothesis essentially stated that people would remember a painful event based on the average of the worst part and the end.
- The duration neglect hypothesis stated that people would ignore the length of the trial when rating total pain.
This elegant study is one of many that show that human
beings are often not as rational as they are frequently portrayed. It
particularly brings up many questions that will impact the medical field.
Should a doctor add time to a painful procedure in order to end at a more
pleasant point, thereby improving the patient’s stored memory, even if that
means intentionally inflicting more pain?
The duration neglect hypothesis does not only apply to
painful memories, but also has serious implications for positive ones. For
example, if planning a beach vacation and deciding between 1 week and 2 weeks, you
might have a better overall memory of the trip if you plan a fun-filled 1 week
vacation that finishes on a high note as opposed to a 2 week long vacation that
seems to drag on at the end.
While the practical implications do pose many ethical
dilemmas that have not yet been resolved, Kahneman and Tversky clearly show
that we may not know ourselves as well as we think we do.
What do you think? Which matters more: the elusive
experiencing self or the persistent remembering self?
For further reading:
The book: Thinking,
Fast and Slow by Daniel Kahneman
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