The Roles of Emotion and Reason on Moral Judgments - A Cognitive Neuroscience Perspective

            

In the field of cognitive science, there exist two opposing models for the roles of emotion and reasoning in moral judgment. The Humean view asserts that emotions determine the judgment and reason – a slave to emotion – functions as a tool for post hoc rationalization. The Jeffersonian view argues that both emotions and reason determine moral judgments. The two articles in this paper each support one of these opposing models. Wheatley and Haidt (2005) found their data to be consistent with the Humean model while Koenigs, Young, Adolphs, Tranel, Cushman, Hauser and Damasio (2007) found their data consistent with the Jeffersonian model. An analysis of these articles reveals that the findings in Wheatley and Haidt (2005) can be viewed as consistent with the Jeffersonian model and Koenigs et al. (2007) simply builds upon those findings. These studies show that both emotions and reason influence moral judgment.

Study 1
Wheatley and Haidt (2005) hypothesized that hypnotically induced disgust would increase the severity of moral judgments. Half the subjects received a posthypnotic suggestion to feel disgust when reading the word often and the other half when reading the word take. They then rated how morally wrong and how disgusting moral transgressions in vignettes were. The subjects were presented with one of two versions of each vignette: one which contained the word take and the other the word often. Participants rated vignettes as more disgusting and morally wrong when the disgust word was present than when it was absent, thus supporting the hypothesis.

To ensure that disgust influenced moral judgments and did not simply make all ratings more negative, Wheatley and Haidt (2005) conducted a modified version of the previous experiment containing a third (control) rating in which the subjects judged a non-transgression item related to the vignette. There was no significant difference between the ratings of items when the disgust word was present than when absent, suggesting that disgust did not make all ratings more negative. However, disgust did make moral judgments more severe even in the case of the “Student Council story,” which contained no moral transgression; when questioned on this particular story, experimenters reported the puzzled subjects answering with post hoc rationalizations. This is consistent with a model in which intuition and emotions determine moral judgments.

Study 2
Koenigs et al. (2007) investigated neurologically how damage to emotion-related areas of the brain influence moral judgment. There were three types of subjects, all with reasonably intact intellects. The first were normal comparison subjects (NC). The second were patients with adult-onset damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPC), a brain region associated with generation of social emotions. The third were brain-damaged comparison (BDC) patients with lesions excluding emotion-related regions of the brain. The subjects either endorsed or rejected actions in fifty hypothetical scenarios. Scenarios were classified as non-moral, impersonal or personal. Personal scenarios were distinguished for their higher emotional salience, determined by a separate group of neurologically normal subjects. Personal scenarios were then separated into high-conflict and low-conflict scenarios based on the level of agreement within and between NC and BDC groups. These high-conflict scenarios were assumed to feature intense competition between utilitarian considerations and an emotional aversion to harming others, a level of competition not present in the low-conflict scenarios. VMPC patients differed from NC and BDC patients only in personal high-conflict scenarios in which they endorsed actions more often than the other groups. Other scenarios elicited reasoned responses from all groups, as demonstrated by the fact that the VMPC group did not differ from the others. The divergence in the personal high-conflict scenarios demonstrates that emotions began to overpower reason in the BDC and NC groups, but not in the VMPC group.

Resolving the "Opposing" Views
Although Wheatley and Haidt (2005) claimed to support a model for moral judgment in conflict with that of Koenigs et al. (2007), it can be argued that Wheatley and Haidt (2005) actually provides further justification for the model proposed by Koenigs et al. (2007). By hypnotically inducing disgust, Wheatley and Haidt (2005) tremendously increased the emotional salience of the vignettes. In this manner, that emotional impact is similar to that found in personal high-conflict scenarios in Koenigs et al. (2007). Both articles would agree that in such scenarios which elicit a strong emotional response, that emotion determines the moral judgment. Thus, Koenigs et al. (2007) simply builds upon the findings of Wheatley and Haidt (2005) to demonstrate that in cases of lower emotional intensity (impersonal scenarios), reason has far more influence. These articles can be reconciled to support the Jeffersonian model in which both reason and emotions influence judgment.

Reconciling the two articles by viewing the emotion elicited by the disgust word in Wheatley and Haidt (2005) as similar to that elicited by personal high-conflict scenarios in Koenigs et al. (2007) contributes much to an understanding of the basis for moral judgment. It provides data consistent with the Jeffersonian model in which both emotions and reason influence moral judgments. In scenarios where the emotional response is minimal, reason dominates as opposed to cases in which the emotional response is strong where reason becomes a slave to emotion.

The Nose (really) Knows

Last semester, at the Kids Judge Neuroscience Fair (a science fair put on by Penn students and judged by students from various neighboring elementary schools), an experiment was titled “Nose Knows.” I didn’t pay much attention to the title of this exposition, and disregarded it just a quirky, alliterative way to catch the attention of our young judges. Up until recently, I hadn’t given this exposition, or its title, much thought.

Last week in one of my classes, I was blown away by the information presented by Dr. Johan Lundstrom, our guest lecturer. Dr. Lundstrom explained how our sense of smell, probably the sense that most of us consider to be the least important, plays a highly underestimated role in our lives. Our sense of smell participates in everything from mate choice to memory and emotional response. Also, surprisingly to me, it is not uncommon for a physician to use his or her sense of smell as a diagnostic tool.

Research on olfaction is continually helping scientists and society to understand the role of the sense of smell in our lives. As science and technology continue to advance, it is likely that we will greater perceive and appreciate this trivialized sense. Who knows, maybe one day Google's April Fool's joke will actually be a reality!

-Beatriz Gadala-Maria

Challenges to Free Will

Recent studies have begun to challenge the notion of free will. Some people argue that free will exists, while others believe it may be a carefully constructed illusion. In order to better understand this concept, cognitive scientists have tried to study human agency by having subjects perform simple motions. One study identified the timing and activation of the brain regions that predetermine conscious intentions. A separate group of researchers focused on the sense of volition that precedes movement itself. In the following two studies, the experimenters use disparate methodologies and techniques to advance the study of individual autonomy.

Study 1:
Soon, Brass, Heinze, and Haynes aimed to elucidate the timing and location of brain region activation that predetermines conscious intention. The subjects were asked to press one of two buttons with either their right or left index finger whenever they felt the urge to do so. The experimenters flashed a series of letters on a screen at 500 millisecond time intervals to determine when the subject made his or her decision. After each finger motion, the subjects reported which letter was on the screen at the time when they made their decision, giving the experimenters a quantitative measure of when the subjects consciously decided. In addition to measuring the timing of the conscious decision, the scientists used fMRI to study the patterns and amount of activity in different brain regions. They looked at the predictive patterns both before and after the subject’s conscious decision.

Soon et al. found that two specific regions in the frontal and parietal cortex provided information that could predict the outcome of the motor decision before the subject was consciously aware of making that decision. They also discovered through the fMRI that unconscious activity in the brain had been affecting the subject’s motor decision for up to 10 seconds before the decision reached consciousness.

Study 2:
In a recent study, Schneider, Houdayer, Bai, and Hallett tried to determine when the sense of volition arises in movement formulation and execution. They used EEG signals to create a predictive model after asking subjects to move their right wrists spontaneously. They could determine with an 18% false positive rate when a person was going to move their right wrist within 1.5 seconds before the movement itself. The experimenters used the model for subsequent real-time prediction sessions. As the subjects moved their wrists during these sessions, they were stopped periodically and prompted to answer two questions: “Did you feel the intention to move?” and “If not, what were you thinking about?” A green light signalled subjects to answer the questions, providing a broad range of data because it turned on either spontaneously or when the predictive model explicitly showed a subject’s intention to move.

The responses to the first question were split into four categories to differentiate between the combinations of movement and intention. “Intention” refers to the intention to move as shown by the brain activity while using the predictive model. 43% were “movement with intention,” 13% were “movement without intention,” 12% were “no movement with intention,” and 32% were “no movement without intention.” The fact that 12% had the intention to move but did not end up moving may be a manifestation of free will because it displays the human capability to stop a movement, despite the brain’s supposed intention to move. There is not yet a conclusive explanation for this phenomenon. Additionally, the experimenters categorized the answers to the second question into subjects of thought which pertained to subjects like the task, light, or movement. The results showed that the participants could be thinking about something non-movement related, even while the brain was preparing to make a voluntary movement.

Study 1 and Study 2:

The results of Schneider et al. and Soon et al. each illuminated potential shortcomings that could have gone unnoticed had these articles not been read in conjunction with one another. The first questionable discrepancy pertains to the timing of the predictions. Soon et al. showed that the intention to move could be seen as far as 10 seconds before the movement itself. At successive points in time and, consequently, during different stages in motor planning, people could acquire varying types of information. Despite this finding, Schneider et al.’s predictive model only aimed to measure the intention to move 1.5 seconds in advance of an actual movement. By focusing solely on the last stages of motor planning, Schneider et al. does not provide as complete of an understanding of the brain activity leading up to movement as Soon et al. Reading Soon et al. makes the reader wonder if the results would have been different or if the predictive model would have been more accurate had the experimenters in Schneider et al. used information from more than 1.5 seconds before movement.

Additionally, reading Schneider et al. illuminated an assumption that is fundamental to Soon et al’s experimental design: the assumption that movement is always intentional. In “Unconscious determinants of free decisions in the human brain,” the possibilities of “movement without intention” or “no movement with intention” simply do not exist. The right and left index finger movements are always associated with an explicit “urge.” Reading Schneider et al. after Soon et al. highlights the important point that intention and movement are not always coupled.

Both of these studies clearly show that voluntary movement can be predicted with reasonable accuracy using tools like fMRI and EEG. While they do conclusively address the idea that there are unconscious determinants that affect decisions, one shortcoming that pertains to them both is that they focus solely on simple motor movements. When people question the notion of free will, their concerns more closely relate to conscious, complex decision-making than to trivial finger and wrist motions. Focusing on simple motor movements is not enough to answer the loftier question about whether or not free will is really limited. Further research is required to better understand human autonomy and the existence of free will, particularly in the context of thoughtful deliberation.

Morality Without God: A Biological Perspective

Chimpanzees engaging in consolatory behavior.
Source: http://www.sciencemuseum.org.uk/antenna/chimps/

According to a recently published study, more than half of Americans believe that moral behavior requires the existence of God. In other words, without God, humanity has no sense of right or wrong. Current empirical research, however, suggests quite the opposite—that morality and religion can be independent of one another. Morality is not derived from the teachings of God, but is an innate capacity that is vital for the survival of social mammals.

At the forefront of this research is Dr. Frans de Waal, a primatologist at Emory University and the Director of Living Links at the Yerkes National Primate Research Center in Atlanta. I had the privilege of hearing Dr. de Waal speak in Bodek Lounge in late October 2012, after he was invited to Penn’s campus by the Center for Neuroscience and Society. Sitting in the third row, I listened intently to his lecture, confounded by his claims that animals are empathetic creatures. Just that summer, I had read Howard Bloom’s The Lucifer Principle, in which he argues that organisms are inherently evil. Mr. Bloom’s argument corroborates the popular belief held by many biologists and anthropologists that natural selection favors self-interested individuals. The new and convincing evidence Dr. de Waal presented, however, contradicted my own opinions on the cruelty of animal nature, as well as those held by much of the scientific community until roughly a decade ago.

Unlike Mr. Bloom, Dr. de Waal offers an alternative take on natural selection. He argues that natural selection produces pro-social behaviors, marked by reconciliation, empathy and consolation, and fairness, that enhance cooperation within a group necessary for its survival. Dr. de Waal’s research on elephants and non-human primates, such as chimpanzees and bonobos, reflects the capacity for complex empathy that motivates moral behavior in animals capable of mirror self-recognition.*

During his lecture, Dr. de Waal shared many astounding anecdotes demonstrating the empathetic nature of animals, one of which takes place in a Swedish zoo.  A juvenile chimpanzee was near death after it had become entangled in a rope, which wrapped twice around its neck. Noticing the choking juvenile, the alpha male of the chimpanzee troop approached the juvenile, lifted it, and successfully unwrapped the rope around its neck. This required two essential criteria necessary for experiencing empathy: self-other distinction and perspective taking, which allows an individual to understand the situation of another. The alpha male understood that the proper way to save the juvenile was to lift it to relieve the pressure of the rope, rather than pull at the rope or the juvenile, because he was able to take on the perspective of the younger chimp. While the story provided demonstrates a sophisticated form of empathy found in animals capable of mirror self-recognition, less cognitively complex animals have also been found to show signs of empathy. For example, if a rat is given the option of saving its comrade who is trapped in a container or munching on a piece of chocolate adjacent to that container, it will choose to save its friend half of the time, after which they both enjoy the chocolate.

While human morality is arguably far richer than solely pro-social behaviors found in the animal kingdom, the creation of moral rules would surely be impossible without an innate moral capacity. Additionally, as Dr. Frans de Waal poses in the opening chapter of his recently published book, The Bonobo and the Atheist, “Does anyone truly believe that our ancestors lacked social norms before they had religion?” (de Waal 2). Morality is an ancient capacity, predating religion and even the existence of mankind, and evidence is quickly mounting to explain its origin. What scientists are finding is that that origin, the origin of human morality, does not include religion.

*Mirror self-recognition, or the ability to recognize oneself in a mirror, has been positively correlated with empathy. In human children, mirror self-recognition is critical for the development of moral character.

If you enjoyed this topic and want to learn more about Dr. Frans de Waal's findings, listen to the lecture, accessible here, that he gave at the AAAS 2012 Annual Meeting in Vancouver. It is remarkably similar to the lecture he gave at Penn, and it is the source of the information I present in this post.

A Wallet Is Not A Gun

On February 5, 1999, Amadou Diallo was shot. Four police officers were walking by his apartment and began to approach him because they thought he resembled the perpetrator in a rape case. As Diallo reached into his pocket, pulling out what the officers believed to be a gun, they fired. When they went to gather his body, they realized that the gun did not exist, finding only a wallet instead.

Why did the officers perceive a wallet as a gun? Most attribute the fatal error to a combination of the atmosphere in the dangerous neighborhood and racial profiling. The officers were all white, and Diallo was a West African immigrant. While there were admittedly other factors at play, this horrific story is not the only instance where a black face provoked an instinctive sense of fear in white individuals.

Cognitive neuroscientists have tried to better understand how people react unconsciously to faces that are racially different than their own. In a research article entitled “Separable Neural Components in the Processing of Black and White Faces,” scientists discuss an experiment that was designed to contrast conscious and controlled modes of thinking. During the fMRI component of the study, the all-white participants were shown a series of black and white faces while getting an fMRI. Some of the faces were flashed for 30 milliseconds, which is too fast for humans to consciously know what they are seeing. Other faces were flashed for 550 milliseconds, which does allow for conscious recognition. The brain activity during the short runs was supposed to measure the unconscious reactions, while the brain activity during the longer runs was intended to measure the conscious ones.

When the subjects were shown black faces for 30 milliseconds, the amygdala, the region of the brain that processes fear and emotion, lit up on the fMRI. When they were shown black faces for 550 milliseconds, there was more activity in the frontal cortex, a region associated with control and regulation. “The data show neural differences between more automatic and controlled processing of social groups, and suggest that reflective processes may interact with and modulate evaluations arising more automatically during perceptual processing.” Essentially, when the subjects were consciously aware of what they were seeing, parts of their brain were able to regulate the automatic fear response and result in a response that reflected their conscious, non-racist views.

The response in the 30-millisecond trials would probably match the fMRI’s of the police officers on the night of Diallo’s death. Due to the stereotypes associated with race and the neighborhood itself and the poor lighting, they were scared when he reached for his pocket, and they acted accordingly. Now, this begs the question: are these responses innate and determined, or are they in our control?

The neighborhood and Diallo’s race were definitely associated with a series of negative stereotypes that were perpetuated by society. At that point, many of them were self-fulfilling prophecies; people were born into neighborhoods where they were expected to act a certain way, so they grew up in that way, and external opinions continued to be accurate. While it is readily acknowledged that people are influenced by the societal norms in which they live, it is interesting to consider the origins of these social constructs.

The creation of categories and groups in societies may stem from a simple biological fear of that which is different. In the past, it makes sense that humans would be scared to encounter groups of people who looked different than their own immediate community. Foreigners brought with them danger, disease, unpredictability, and a threat to coveted resources. Reacting as the police officers did and getting rid of the different group would have made sense millions of years ago.

So, do the social constructs come from biology? Or does the biological response come from social constructs? I prefer to believe that the evolutionary explanation is the answer to this chicken-egg question, but it is hard to come to a definite conclusion because humans have never existed in isolation without the communal, societal context at play. Regardless, these social constructs are now such an accepted part of our society that peoples’ unconscious reactions and neural wiring are actually impacted by them. The biological response led to a social construct, which led to a biological response, which led to a social construct…and you can see where I’m going with this.

What implications does this have for society? Going forward, one should remember the portion of the study that explained the frontal cortex’s ability to control the innate, learned response. Be aware of your biases. The Implicit Association Test is one measure of unconscious predispositions toward members of specific groups. The tests are not limited to race, but also to ideas like gender and sexual orientation. You can take it here. After becoming more cognizant of your own prejudices, use judgment when acting. Realize that your brain may act in ways that are discordant with how you actually want to interact with the world, and take that into account when going through your daily life. Perhaps if the police officers were more aware of their own states of mind on February 5, 1999, they would have taken that extra second to realize that a wallet was not a gun.